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Abstract
Crowding out during the British Industrial Revolution has long been one of the leading
explanations for slow growth during the Industrial Revolution, but little empirical evidence
exists to support it. We argue that examinations of interest rates are fundamentally misguided,
and that the 18th- and early 19th-century private loan market balanced through quantity
rationing. Using a unique set of observations on lending volume at a London goldsmith bank,
Hoares Bank, we document the impact of wartime ﬁnancing on private credit markets. We
conclude that there is considerable evidence that government borrowing, especially during
wartime, crowded out private credit.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
How did government policy inﬂuence Englands ﬁnancial and economic develop-
ment during the Industrial Revolution? Depending on the time period in question,
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www.elsevier.com/locate/eehthe existing literature suggests diametrically opposed answers. For the years before
1750, North and Weingast famously argued that government ﬁnance was central
to the origins and course of the First Industrial Revolution. Better institutions
and public debt management following the Glorious Revolution allegedly lowered
risk premia and improved property rights (Acemoglu et al., 2002; North and Wein-
gast, 1989). Subsequently, however, Englands frequent wars during the 18th cen-
tury—fought with the ﬁscal machine installed by William of Orange and his
Dutch advisors—increased public debt. Williamson argued that wartime ﬁnance
‘‘crowded-out’’ private investment, slowing output growth (Williamson, 1984).
For all their intuitive appeal, evidence supporting both hypotheses has been scant.
Many authors have examined changes in interest rates and the yield on private as-
sets. Mokyr asserted that, ‘‘A logical corollary of the crowding-out hypotheses is
that real interest rates should have risen for crowding out to occur’’ (Clark, 2001;
Mirowski, 1981; Mokyr, 1987, p. 300; Quinn, 2001; Sussman and Yafeh, 2002). Price
analysis is an attractive research strategy for economic historians; they can be as use-
ful as quantities, and are often easier to collect (Antra `s and Voth, 2003). We argue
however that private-sector interest rates are not the right indicator of scarcity in the
case of 18th-century ﬁnance—for both practical and conceptual reasons. In contrast
to goods markets, where price is an eﬃcient way of allocating scarce goods, credit
markets rarely reach equilibrium through changes in interest rates alone. Since usury
laws historically set a maximum interest rate below the market-clearing rate for pri-
vate loans, rationing was the only way to restore equilibrium. Also, even in the ab-
sence of legal constraints, lenders had strong incentives to ration credit at lower
rates. Hence, interest rates showed ‘‘excess stability.’’ As Ashton put it: ‘‘the exis-
tence of this upper limit (on interest rates) is of the utmost importance to an under-
standing of the ﬂuctuations of the period. Once the critical point had been reached
further borrowing might become impossible’’ (Ashton, 1959).
The North–Weingast interpretation of Englands rise is elegant, and it ties in with
a growing literature on the institutional and ﬁnancial determinants of development.
Theoretical arguments strongly suggest that the Glorious Revolution ought to have
played a role in the economys initial transformation—historically, greater con-
straints on the executive often are correlated with higher growth (Acemoglu et al.,
2001; DeLong and Shleifer, 1993). The same is true of ﬁnancial development, as
measured by the volume of intermediated ﬁnance, which appears to be robustly asso-
ciated with higher per capita incomes in post-war samples, as well as during some
historical periods (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Rousseau
and Sylla, 2001). According to North and Weingast, the institutional changes follow-
ing the Glorious Revolution made lending to the government a far safer proposition.
Parliaments increasing inﬂuence and growing constraints on the executive translated
into lower risk premia. This allowed for cheaper borrowing by the private sector, too
(North and Weingast, 1989). Capital accumulation should thus have accelerated un-
der William and the Hanoverian kings largely because of institutional change.
According to the North–Weingast hypothesis, institutional change was the main rea-
son why England became the ﬁrst industrial nation, and ﬁnance was the key variable
transmitting the benign eﬀects of reform.
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ish government increased markedly without the recurring ﬁnancial crises that were
typical in other European countries, it remains doubtful whether political reform
was crucial for lowering the cost of borrowing. Sussman and Yishay recently have
compiled new time series of interest rates paid by the English government. They ﬁnd
little evidence that political reform inﬂuenced the rates at which the British govern-
ment could borrow. Instead, armed conﬂict seems a much more important determi-
nant of public interest rates (Sussman and Yafeh, 2002). Yet the main emphasis of
the original North–Weingast argument was on capital investment, with the interest
rate on government bonds as an indicator of the private cost of ﬁnance. Evidence for
a decline in private-sector interest rates is far from abundant. Any change that did
occur may have been obscured by the usury laws, which prescribed a maximum
interest rate of 6% before 1714 and 5% percent thereafter. Thus, the ‘‘shadow’’ rate
for private-sector borrowing may have moved markedly more than is suggested by
the yield on consols. Quinn, examining loan transactions at a private bank in Lon-
don, ﬁnds no evidence that the Glorious Revolution had an impact on interest rates
charged (Quinn, 2001). To analyse the issue further, Clark collected data on asset
returns obtained by charities. Rent charges and land rents, his principal sources,
have the advantage that they were not subject to the usury laws, oﬀsetting the disad-
vantage of not coming from ﬁnancial markets. Between the 16th and the 18th cen-
tury, both the return on rent charges and on land rents declined, but neither the
civil war nor the Glorious Revolution left much of a trace in the series.
Similar problems with interest rates emerge from the debate on ‘‘crowding out,’’
where available data on the scarcity of credit is insuﬃcient to test the hypothesis con-
clusively (Williamson, 1987). Output growth per capita probably never exceeded
1.5% per annum between 1750 and 1850, and total factor productivity contributed
no more than 0.5% for most of the period (Antra `s and Voth, 2003; Crafts and Har-
ley, 1992). The view that growth in Britain during the 18th and early 19th century
was far slower than most scholars had assumed is now well-established, even if some
implications remain puzzling (Temin, 1997). Yet the causes of relatively unspectac-
ular growth are far less well understood. One interesting feature of the disappointing
growth performance is the limited rate of capital accumulation. By 1830, the British
economy had only managed to equip its workers, farmhands, and clerks with more
or less the same number of tools, buildings, and desks that their great-grandfathers
had used (Crafts, 1985; Harley, 1999). Williamson argued that relatively ‘‘slow’’ out-
put growth during the Industrial Revolution may have been the result of massive
government borrowing. According to this view, the frequent and costly wars that
Britain fought during the 18th century were crucial in slowing down capital forma-
tion (Williamson, 1984). Government borrowing thus ‘‘crowded out’’ private invest-
ment; it was the Revolutionary Wars with France that stopped Britains Industrial
Revolution from turning into a growth spurt.
Hard evidence in favor of this argument has been hard to ﬁnd. In his original con-
tribution, Williamson calibrated a model of the British economy. Assuming a one-to-
one oﬀset between public borrowing and private capital accumulation, he estimated
very large eﬀects from the French Wars. Real wages could have grown faster by 1.3%
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decided to ﬁght the French Republic, it could have grown twice as fast as it actually
did. Critics were quick to point out that yields on consols did not show strong in-
creases during wartime. Heim and Mirowski emphasized that nominal interest rates
were somewhat higher during the Revolutionary Wars with France, but that real
yields were lower (Heim and Mirowski, 1987; Heim and Mirowski, 1991).
2 Again,
charity returns do not show an impact of wartime ﬁnancing.
In both the case of the North–Weingast hypothesis and the crowding-out argu-
ment, the changes in interest rates appear relatively small. The late Stuart kings
had borrowed for about 2% more than their Hanoverian successors (Sussman and
Yafeh, 2002).
3 While a similar decline in private-sector interest rates probably would
have caused some acceleration of growth and capital accumulation, it is hard to see
that it could have initiated the broad-based transformation that got under way after
1700. Also, the diﬀerences between peacetime and wartime cost of ﬁnance during the
late 18th centuries were not large enough to account for the drastic slowdown in
growth claimed by Williamson. At the same time, ‘‘silent’’ crowding out due to
the usury laws seems to be hard to prove (Clark, 1996). Indeed, some authors have
concluded that the high elasticity of savings in 18th-century England can only be
called ‘‘puzzling’’ (Clark, 2001; Ferguson, 2001). Neal rationalized the apparent ab-
sence of crowding-out as a result of international capital market integration. Foreign
lenders, especially the Dutch, ﬁnanced a substantial part of Britains deﬁcit, thus mit-
igating the eﬀects on the domestic economy. This mechanism may have been partic-
ularly pronounced during the Revolutionary Wars, when Britain attracted ﬂight
capital from the continent (Neal, 1990, p. 216). We will test the importance of inter-
national capital ﬂows later.
2. Credit rationing and the stability of interest rates
We propose a simple way of solving the elasticity-of-savings puzzle in this paper:
credit rationing. If rationing was common, we should ﬁnd that lending took place at
a standardized rate, and that it did not respond to changes in economic conditions.
Instead, the market should have balanced through quantity rationing. Credit ration-
ing—the refusal of lenders to provide loans independent of the interest rate oﬀered—
is common in ﬁnancial markets today. Asymmetric information is crucial—because
borrowers willing to pay very high interest rates are inherently bad risks, banks need
other ways of allocating credit than through changes in the interest rate charged. The
more scarce reliable information about borrowers is, the harder it will be to diﬀeren-
tiate rates at all (Jaﬀee and Stiglitz, 1990). As Stiglitz and Weiss argued, credit
rationing probably accounts for a fair share of modern-day macroeconomic ﬂuctu-
ations (Jaﬀee and Stiglitz, 1990; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
2 This does not necessarily imply that borrowing costs were low—since contemporaries rightly expected
deﬂation, high nominal interest rates probably translated into high ex ante real rates (Williamson, 1987).
3 The only exception is limited loans, secured in unusual circumstances (cf. North and Weingast, 1989).
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18th-century credit markets. In a famous passage from the Wealth of Nations, Adam
Smith observed that (Smith, 1982 [1776], b. 2, c. 4.):
If the legal rate of interest in Great Britain, for example, was ﬁxed so high as
eight or ten per cent, the greater part of the money which was to be lent would
be lent to prodigals and projectors, who alone would be willing to give this high
interest. Sober people, who will give for the use of money no more than a part
of what they are likely to make by the use of it, would not venture into the
competition. A great part of the capital of the country would thus be kept
out of the hands which were most likely to make a proﬁtable and advantageous
use of it, and thrown into those which were most likely to waste and destroy it.
Smith therefore suggested that usury limits were economically eﬃcient. In 18th-
century Britain, adverse selection problems would have been substantial if interest
rates had been allowed to rise to market-clearing levels. Private lenders should have
found it advantageous to curtail lending and discriminate against borrowers who
would have been willing to pay the market-clearing rate.
Ashton also questioned the usefulness of interest rates as an indicator of scarcity,
and described the situation of the credit-market during wartime thus (Ashton, 1959):
It was not, then, simply through a rise in the cost of borrowing, but through
interruptions to the ﬂow of funds, that depression came to [the building and
construction trade]. ...When the rate of 5 per cent had been reached builders
and contractors might be getting all the loans they wanted, or, on the other
hand, many of them might be in acute need of more. If we want to know
the degree of scarcity we must look for other sources of information.
In the case highlighted by Ashton, a methodology that focuses exclusively on
interest rates cannot shed much light on the crowding-out hypothesis and on the ef-
fects of institutional reform after 1688. Pressnell applied this reasoning to wartime,
reporting that ‘‘war ﬁnance strained the resources and the patience at the Bank of
England, causing it to ration discounts to the public at the end of 1795’’ (Pressnell,
1956).
Fig. 1 presents a simple model of quantity rationing.
4 Assume that the market ini-
tially clears at r0. Lending volume is equal to Q0. With a demand shock that moves
the demand curve outwards—such as public borrowing in wartime—lending volume
should rise, and the loan market would balance at r1.
5 If the legally permitted max-
imum is r2, however, quantity will be rationed at Q1. The shadow cost of capital s1
will be markedly higher than r2. This is the maximum interest rate that the last
borrower would have been willing to pay if all his surplus was appropriated by
4 Based on Jaﬀee and Stiglitz (1990). Their assumption that each bank earns quasi-rents from its
knowledge of its customers and the volume of loans is less than in the competitive equilibrium is not
relevant here.
5 This will depend on the extent to which borrowers are indiﬀerent between the types of securities
oﬀered.
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of interest rates at which lending occurs, the larger the rise in the shadow rate will be.
If interest rates had been close to the legal maximum before a demand shock, the
loan market would have continued to supply Q0 at r0. The shadow rate would then
have risen to s2.
In a credit market characterized by the situation in Fig. 1, examining interest-rate
changes such as the one from r0 to r1 is not very informative. To make sense of the
role of government and government ﬁnance in Englands economic development, we
must take the possibility of quantity rationing seriously. We need information on the
total volume of loans made.
Comprehensive information on aggregate lending volume is unavailable. Instead,
we use the records of a West-End bank, Hoares, to examine the issue of credit
rationing. Hoares Bank was (and is) a private bank in the West End of London. Ini-
tially founded by Richard Hoare, a goldsmith, it energetically moved into banking
from the 1690s onwards. From 1702, Hoares focused on lending and securities trad-
ing, shedding the remnants of its goldsmithing business (Temin and Voth, 2003,
2004). The bank soon acquired a select clientele that took out a variety of loans,
from mortgages to securities lending and pawns against jewellery. By the 1730s, it
was lending more than £150,000 per year, and taking deposits of up to £450,000.
Since 1702, Hoares drew up annual balance sheets. Normally compiled in Septem-
ber, they summarize the banks debts to depositors and the partners, its claims on
Fig. 1. A model of credit rationing.
330 P. Temin, H.-J. Voth / Explorations in Economic History 42 (2005) 325–348borrowers, and holdings of silver and precious stones, of cash and securities. We col-
lected the balance sheets from 1702 to 1862, except for a few missing years near the
beginning of our period. The reporting format varied, but it almost always contained
information on total lending volume, total deposits, and cash reserves.
The bank was, of course, only one of several such institutions involved in credit
intermediation. In addition to other banks, scriveners oﬀered intermediation services
similar to those provided by French notaries, and much lending took the form of
trade credit and personal lending (Hoﬀman et al., 2000; Richards, 1929). Joslin esti-
mated that there were 13 ‘‘West End’’ bankers in 1725, and 15 in 1785, and that the
total number of banks in London rose from 24 to 52 over the period. These are con-
servative, lower bound estimates. As early as 1770, some scholars calculate the total
number of London banks to be as high as 42 (Quinn, 1997).
We cannot know with any accuracy how representative Hoares Bank was. The
banks longevity itself suggests that it may not have been typical. It also operated
in the capital city, close to the seat of government and the government debt market.
The banks location suggests that it may have been more exposed to government-in-
duced scrambles for liquidity. We can test for similarities for a small subset of
years—from 1844, we have the volume of deposits held by the public and by bankers
at the Bank of England. If we apply the same methods of separating trend from cycle
as in the rest of the paper, we ﬁnd a positive correlation coeﬃcient of 0.38 with
Hoares deposits, signiﬁcant at the 10% level (Mitchell, 1971, p. 658).
6 There is no
evidence that deposits at Hoares are more volatile—the standard deviation of devi-
ations from trend are very similar. This, of course, cannot tell us how representative
Hoares bank was for the period before 1844, which is key for the crowding-out is-
sue. Yet it makes it less likely that the banks business was driven by forces funda-
mentally diﬀerent than those operating throughout the ﬁnancial system as a whole.
In any case, we lack similar records from other banks in the 18th century. We
study Hoares Bank because it is the only one with extant records.
7 We believe that
the best way forward is a number of studies using ﬁrm-level evidence; this paper is
partly an attempt to stimulate further research and data collection that can allow
corroboration or refutation of our hypothesis that lending at Hoares was broadly
representative of economy-wide patterns.
Was Hoares rationing credit? Our ﬁrst piece of evidence comes simply from the
distribution of interest rates. Fig. 2 shows the distribution of lending rates with the
individual loans as the unit of observation. In the early 18th century, Hoares made
6 The strongly upward trend over these years should not drive our results; hence the separation of trend
and cycle by using the deviations of log deposits from trend and trend squared (as below). We also
experimented with an error-in-variables regression, with deposits at Hoares as the dependent variable and
at the BOE as the explanatory variable, and a noise to signal ratio of 0.5. This suggested a coeﬃcient of
0.68 on log deposits at the BOE, which is no longer signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from unity (but strongly diﬀerent
from zero).
7 The data from Childs analysed by Quinn may be used in similar fashion. Since there appear to be no
surviving balance sheets, this will require the reconstruction of aggregate lending ﬁgures for each year from
individual loan transactions, and requires that any degree of archival loss is constant over time (cf. Quinn,
2001).
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(Temin and Voth, 2003). Qualitative evidence reinforces the view that quantity
rationing was frequent. Hoares bank told one of its clients who sought to take
out a loan that, independent of the conditions oﬀered, it could not extend credit
(Brewer, 1989):
8
At present we do not advance Money to anyone on any security...The uncom-
mon supply of millions and millions granted and now raised [to pay for the
Seven Years War] obliges all of our Profession to be prepared for the Pay-
ments [to customers moving their money from the bank into government stock]
coming on, so that instead of lending out money, we have called it in on this
occasion.
In a situation like the one described in Hoares letter to its customer, there is little
reason to believe that private interest rates yield much information on the availabil-
ity and cost of credit. We ﬁnd that Hoares acted in way that is compatible with the
argument set out in its letter—during wartime, it kept 29.5% of its assets in cash,
compared to 25.1% during peacetime. Two channels may have been crucial for trans-
mitting government borrowing shocks to the ﬁnancial system. First, as described by
Hoares, customers may have switched their savings from bank deposits to govern-
ment debt. At a time when banks habitually refused to pay any interest on deposits,
government bonds yielding approximately 3–6% must have seemed an attractive
alternative. Second, the partners at Hoares may have invested some of their capital
in bonds rather than in the bank. This would have led them to restrict loans
additionally.
8 Other reasons may have inclined Hoares not to lend to the client in question. The bank may have
chosen a convenient excuse. Yet the fact that the general credit restriction brought on by government
borrowing was seen as a plausible reason not to lend tells us that many other ﬁnancial institutions may
have followed similar practices.
Fig. 2. Distribution of interest rates.
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ever the governments borrowing requirements increased markedly. The balance
sheets, combined with information on the public debt of the United Kingdom, allow
us to test this hypothesis in more detail.
In our attempt to trace credit rationing, as exempliﬁed by the case of Hoares, we
argue for the following simple causal chain: higher wartime borrowing simulta-
neously increased the availability of liquid government debt and raised the price
of borrowing. As clients used their accumulated deposits to purchase government
debt, banks lent less. Since almost all lending was at the maximum rate allowed
by the usury laws, this did not become apparent in higher rates on private loan trans-
actions. Instead, lending volume contracted, as less desirable (or less well-connected)
borrowers lost access to credit. In addition, the bank may have decided to hold gov-
ernment debt instead of lending to private individuals or ﬁrms.
3. Government borrowing and private lending: evidence from Hoares
To separate trend from cycle for all our variables, we regress the log of each
variable Z on a constant, a time trend, and the trend squared (to capture
non-linearities):
logZ ¼ C þ aT þ bT
2 þ e: ð1Þ
This simple setup allows us to explain 94% of the total variation in lending vol-
ume. In our analysis, we will mainly use the residuals e of Hoares lending volume
(HGAP), of government debt (DebtGAP), and of industrial output (QGAP). We
use these variables in the quantitative analysis below. Because of missing observa-
tions on the size of Hoares balance sheet and because of our focus on the period
of the industrial revolution, we use data from 1720 onwards.
The top panel of Fig. 3 gives an impression of the growth of Hoares business. The
bottom panel shows the type of shocks (HGAP) that need to be explained. Hoares
lending against interest grew from £50,000 in 1702 to over £2,000,000 in 1860. The
rise parallels the increase in total output in the British economy over the period,
and suggests higher demand for intermediation services. This long, continuous up-
ward trend in total lending was sometimes checked or even reversed by conditions
in any one year, by the vagaries of a family business where a partners death can lead
to changes in the banks equity, and the political situation.
To examine the impact of wartime ﬁnancing, in Fig. 4 we plot the lending residual
HGAP alongside the growth of public debt (DebtGAP). While lending ﬂuctuates
with greater frequency, the overall impression is one of a strong, inverse correlation
between lending and debt growth. At the very beginning of the period, during the
War of the Spanish Succession, lending growth relative to trend was lacklustre.
There is ample evidence that massive government borrowing was an important con-
tributing factor, even if some of the slowdown must be attributed to factors speciﬁc
to Hoares bank itself (Temin and Voth, 2003). During the War of Jenkins Ear and
the Wars of the Austrian Succession, lending growth relative to trend slowed, but the
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deceleration, as does the War of American Independence in the 1770s and early
1780s. During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, lending fell in absolute
terms for a number of years. Relative to the secular trend, there was a very marked
Fig. 3. Lending volume at Hoares, trend and residual (HGAP).
Fig. 4. Government debt and lending at Hoares—deviations from trend.
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mean War in the 1850s. By no measure did all sudden reversals coincide with the out-
break of war, but Fig. 4 suggests that declines may have been much more common in
wartime. Sixty-eight percent of war-years showed a negative deviation from trend,
but only 37% of peacetime years did—the HGAP variable is twice as likely to take
on negative values during war than during peacetime.
9
A simple t test reveals the extent to which lending at Hoares suﬀered from the
negative shocks of wartime—the average lending residual in non-war years is
£49,710 vs.  8648 during wartime. Lending declined by 5% on average when Britain
found itself at war, and grew by 4.1% during peacetime. The diﬀerence is signiﬁcant
at the 99% level. Shocks during wartime are primarily negative, while shocks during
peacetime were largely positive. In Fig. 5, we plot the smoothed distributions of lend-
ing volume (HGAP) to show the gap between actual lending and trend lending at
Hoares, conditional on whether or not the country is at war.
10 The median change
in lending in a war year was  8.1%; in peacetime, it was 5.6%.
11
To describe the evolution of lending, we brieﬂy examine correlations between our
main variables (Table 1). Public sector interest rates were correlated both with the
growth rate of lending at Hoares and the banks cash ratio. Not surprisingly, high
interest rates were correlated with high debt volumes and wars. More importantly
for this paper, high interest rates were associated with slowdowns in the growth of
industrial production.
9 A v
2 test suggests that the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Fig. 5. Lending volume at Hoares (HGAP), wartime (=1) and peacetime (=0).
10 We use a non-parametric technique (Epanechnikov kernel density estimation) for smoothing.
11 The visual impression from Fig. 5 is conﬁrmed by a median regression. We ﬁnd a coeﬃcient of minus
0.14, with a t-statistic of 3.85. For methodological background, see Koenker and Hallock (2001).
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can use this single bank as a proxy for more general credit conditions. To be sure, it
is heroic to assume that Hoares is broadly representative of all banks. But since
there are no other data on private lending volumes, we make this assumption out
of necessity, not by choice. We explore some of the possible biases below.
The strong decline of lending growth during years of massive government borrow-
ing should not come as a surprise. Since the median length of a loan at Hoares was
281 days, the bank could inﬂuence its total lending relatively quickly—calling in
loans or refusing credit, as described in its letter to its prospective client. For the ﬁrst
40 years, we can easily separate deposits from partners equity. Customers funds fell
signiﬁcantly when government borrowing increased. Since the bank did not pay
interest on deposits, it had no reason to turn depositors away. The decline in loan-
able funds oﬀers a ready explanation for the negative correlation of lending with
government borrowing. Equity is not signiﬁcantly correlated with interest rates or
Hoares lending. Higher public debt is negatively correlated with partners equity,
but this correlation, while statistically signiﬁcant, depends crucially on a handful
of observations. We only have data on the ﬁrms equity for 1702–24, and the results
consequently have to be treated with care. Equity rose and fell with the death of part-
ners and the entry of new ones, but competition by the public purse for funds may
have been an additional factor.
12
For more systematic tests, we use the lending gap depicted in Fig. 3 as the depen-
dent variable in our regressions, taking the overall upward trend of lending over the
century-and-a-half between 1702 and 1862 as given. This has the added beneﬁt that
our dependent variable is stationary. In Table 2, we use a variety of speciﬁcations to
demonstrate the robustness of the link between government borrowing and private
lending. We estimate
Table 1
Correlations of key variables, 1720–1862















***  0.12  0.37
**




*,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1% level of conﬁdence. t-statistics calculated on the
basis of heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
icomposite is derived from the marginal borrowing rate excluding terminable loans in Sussman and Yafeh
(2002), spliced to the consol rate (after 1731), HGAP is deviation of log lending volume at Hoares from a
quadratic trend, as depicted in Fig. 3. DebtGAP is the deviation of log government debt from a quadratic
trend, based on the data from Mitchell (1971, p. 600), QGAP is deviation of log industrial output from a
quadratic trend, with the annual series taken from Crafts and Harley (1992), WAR is a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 during wartime, and 0 otherwise. Equity is partners equity in the ﬁrm.
12 The data are described in greater detail in Temin and Voth (2003).
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where HGAP is the residual from Fig. 3, C1 is the intercept, X is one of the exoge-
nous variables, and e is the error term.
Table 2 shows the impact of more costly government debt service and wartime
conditions on lending volume at Hoares Bank. We use two interest rate series.
The yield on consols and similar instruments is only available from 1730.
13 For
the period before that date, we use the series compiled by Sussman and Yafeh which
gives the ratio of debt service to debt outstanding, excluding payments for termina-
ble loans. We splice the series in 1731 to derive one overall series for the cost of gov-
ernment debt service. In addition, we experiment with using the consol rate only. For
every percentage point extra, lending at Hoares declined by 14–17% more than it
otherwise would have done. The impact is broadly speaking unchanged between
the longer interest series and the one for consols, which suggests a slightly greater
impact. During wartime, lending is about 9% lower than normal. This tallies well
with the fact that consol rates during wartime are two-thirds of a percentage point
higher on average than during peacetime. Debt increases above trend depress lending
strongly and signiﬁcantly.
The OLS estimates appear to suﬀer from serial correlation—Lagrange multiplier
tests strongly reject the null of no autocorrelation in the error term. Hence, we also
use the Marquardt NLS estimator. It yields similar coeﬃcients on the interest rate
variables and conﬁrms their statistical signiﬁcance. The coeﬃcient on war now drops
13 We use data from Sussman and Yafeh (2002). We thank Nathan Sussman and Yishay Yafeh for
kindly making their data available. Their data on consols include annuity rates for the period 1730–1753.
Table 2























Estimator: OLS Marquardt NLS
Adj. R






** 1.08 0.38 0.93
Note.
*,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance at the 90, 95, and 99% level of conﬁdence. t-statistics calculated on the
basis of heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Dependent variable is the deviation of log lending from trend.
Sample period is 1720–1862, except for Eqs. (3) and (7), where data availability requires us to start in 1731.
P. Temin, H.-J. Voth / Explorations in Economic History 42 (2005) 325–348 337substantially and is no longer signiﬁcant, but this may be an artefact of the estima-
tion method and the correction procedure for serial correlation.
Implicitly, we assume that Hoares lending data are a useful proxy for overall
credit conditions. Yet in actual fact, they will not have moved in lock-step with lend-
ing at Hoares: TGAP = HGAP + m, where TGAP is the deviation of aggregate lend-
ing from trend. As long as m is uncorrelated with HGAP, OLS will yield unbiased
estimates of the parameters in (1)—we are eﬀectively just adding another error term.
On the other hand, if m is correlated with any of the exogenous variables, OLS will be
inconsistent and biased, and we will over- or underestimate a.
In estimating Eq. (1), we also assumed that the interest rate on government bor-
rowing was unaﬀected by lending at Hoares and its peers—the error term e,w e
implicitly argued, is uncorrelated with any of the explanatory variables. This is prob-
ably correct for the war dummy, but the borrowing rate for the government could be
correlated with the error term. If a savings ‘‘shortage’’ because of, say, competing
Dutch borrowing or the South Sea bubble pushed up the public interest rate, this
may also have made it harder for Hoares to obtain deposits and lend. We would
be falsely attributing this change to the government if borrowing had increased at
the same time. The bias could also point in the opposite direction, with economic
growth raising the marginal product of capital, stimulating loan demand, and reduc-
ing government borrowing due to higher tax revenues. If interest rate shocks for gov-
ernment debt were partly driven by higher borrowing demand from the private
sector, then we will have estimated a lower bound on the true eﬀect of government
borrowing.
To sidestep these issues, we do two things. First, we try to control for macroeco-
nomic conditions, by including the index of industrial output growth in our
regressions.
14 Second, we use an instrumental variables approach, and jointly
estimate:
HGAP ¼ C1 þ ai þ bQGAP þ e; ð3Þ
i ¼ C2 þ aW þ dQGAP þ u; ð4Þ
where i is the government borrowing rate, QGAP is the deviation of log output from
trend, W is a war dummy, and e and u are error terms (Table 3). The second equation
identiﬁes the component of i that is driven by government wartime borrowing. This
is then used to explain lending shocks at Hoares bank, using two stage least squares
(TSLS) for estimation. In addition to simply using the war dummy, we also use gov-
ernment borrowing as an instrument for the interest rate. The underlying assumption
is that lending at Hoares was not inﬂuenced by public borrowing or war in any way
other than through the eﬀect on public interest rates or borrowing volume.
We ﬁnd broadly similar coeﬃcients on public sector interest rates than under
OLS, with lending declining by 11–26% for every additional 100 basis points of debt
14 We use the revised best guess, as compiled by Crafts and Harley (1992) (Table 3.1).
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driven by war were less inimical to bank lending and intermediation—it could be the
case that some of these interest rate increases reﬂected growing demand for private-
sector credit. The eﬀect is stronger and more signiﬁcant when we use the consol rate
as an explanatory variable. This is most likely driven by the nature of our data—the
earlier interest rate series based on average interest payments relative to debt, while
comparable, is not exactly a yield series. For the period that matters for our argu-
ment, the years after 1750, the consol series suggests strong negative eﬀects of gov-
ernment borrowing on private lending. Including changes in industrial output
appears to make little diﬀerence to our estimates. Given that the average diﬀerence
in public sector interest rates between war- and peacetime was 62 basis points, the
results in Table 3 suggest an average drop of lending below its trend value by 7–16%.
Williamson assumed that there was 1:1 ‘‘crowding out’’ between private lending
and government borrowing. Our estimates in Table 2 suggest a range of 0.20–
0.34, smaller than Williamsons estimate but still substantial. Since some of our
right-hand side variables may be endogenous, it is natural to use a VAR approach
to examine the impact of government borrowing on growth
HGAPt ¼ a11HGAPt 1 þ a12HGAPt 2 þ a13HGAPt 3 þ b11DebtGAPt 1
þ b12DebtGAPt 2 þ b13DebtGAPt 3 þ c1 þ e1t; ð5Þ
DebtGAPt ¼ a21DebtGAPt 1 þ a22DebtGAPt 2 þ a23DebtGAPt 3
þ b21HGAPt 1 þ b22HGAPt 2 þ b23HGAPt 3 þ c2 þ e2t: ð6Þ
In this way, using non-structural estimation, we impose few constraints, and allow
for feedback eﬀects from, say, higher private-sector lending (as a result of buoyant
loan demand during good time) to lower government borrowing. We estimate with
Table 3
IV estimates of the impact of government borrowing on private lending










(13.1) (12.3) (11.82) (11.0) (11.9) (10.9) (2.3) (10.6)
icomposite  0.11
*  0.11  0.11
*  0.22
**






(3.2) (2.4) (3.0) (3.05)
QGAP 0.17  1.5  1.84  0.15
(0.48) (1.2) (1.1) (0.5)
Instrument WAR WAR WAR WAR Dgap Dgap Dgap Dgap
Adj. R
2 0.68 0.72 0.68 0.63 0.68 0.72 0.58 0.71
Note.
*,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance at the 90, 95, and 99% level of conﬁdence. t-statistics calculated on the
basis of heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Dependent variable is HGAP.
Sample period is 1720–1862, except for Eqs. (2), (4), (6), and (8), where data availability requires us to start
in 1730.
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15 The impulse response function for lending is plotted in Fig. 6. A one stan-
dard deviation increase of the governments debt stock (equivalent to 8%) reduced
lending by 3% in the ﬁrst year, by 5% in the second year, and by 5.5% in the third
year. The eﬀect remains statistically signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst 4 years. This suggests that
Britains wars represented a major shock to the nascent system of credit intermedi-
ation, and that its eﬀects were strongly negative. The true impact over several years
therefore may well be closer to unity.
4. Credit rationing and economic growth
Using ﬁrm-level data on lending volumes, we ﬁnd clear evidence of credit ration-
ing as a result of wartime borrowing. This is a necessary step towards showing that
‘‘crowding out’’ was important, but it is not suﬃcient. Did it matter for Britains eco-
nomic performance? We emphasize two facts.
First, higher debt growth coincided with slower output growth. Fig. 7 shows the
extent to which the two time series moved inversely over the 18th and 19th century.
We use the industrial output series compiled by NFR Crafts and Knick Harley
(Crafts and Harley, 1992). Higher debt growth especially during the War of the Aus-
trian Succession, the Seven Years War, the War of American Independence, and the
Napoleonic Wars went hand-in-hand with lower output growth. After the battle of
Waterloo, the inverse relationship largely disappears. Relative to trend, the indus-
trial sector of the British economy grew on average by 3.1% during peacetime,
and by  4.6% during wartime.
Second, the decline in lending volumes during wartime was probably large enough
to account for the marked slowdown, as argued in Section 3. Conclusive proof of a
connection is almost impossible, but we can examine some of the circumstantial evi-
15 We orthogonalize the responses by using the Cholesky decomposition, and the ordering (DebtGAP,
HGAP).
Fig. 6. Response of HGAP to Choletsky one SD innovation of DebtGAP.
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the detrended lending volume at Hoares as a proxy for the aggregate. In years when
lending at Hoares was above trend, the diﬀerence between industrial output growth
in wartime and in peacetime is small and not signiﬁcant—a mere 0.5% (Table 4).
When lending was below trend, however, growth overall was slower, and the diﬀer-
ence between years with and without armed conﬂict was pronounced—9%. We
therefore have some evidence that Britains wars were indeed bad for the growth
of industrial output, and that the transmission of the shock depended partly on
Table 4
Industrial output growth during wartime and peacetime
Entire period HGAP P 0 HGAP < 0
During
Peacetime 0.032 0.032 0.033
(89) (61) (28)
Wartime  0.024 0.037  0.06
(53) (18) (35)
Diﬀerence 0.056  0.005 0.09
t test
a 4.73 0.28 5.3
Signiﬁcance 0.0001 0.78 0.0001
Note. Number of observations in parentheses; sample period is 1720–1862. t-statistics calculated on the
basis of heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Dependent variable is QGAP
a Assuming equal variances.
Fig. 7. Output growth and government debt.
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general, and wartime coincided with a fall in production; when it held up more or
less well, growth was more rapid and even years of military conﬂict did little to dent
the rise of the First Industrial Nation.
16
A closer look at the distributions suggests that it is mainly ‘‘growth disasters’’ that
are responsible for the results in Fig. 6. During wartime, 85% of the output devia-
tions are negative if lending was below trend. If it was above trend, fewer than half
of the years in our sample recorded negative deviations of output growth.
One simple test of the proposed link explaining the slowdown runs from greater
borrowing to higher interest rates on government bonds and hence slower industrial
output growth. Table 5 investigates the basic patterns. A rise in interest rates almost
always coincided with a slowdown in growth. The result holds independent of the
estimation technique used and the speciﬁcation of the interest rate variable. We also
ﬁnd a direct eﬀect of war; since conﬂict (and its eﬀects) typically lasted for more than
1 year, the serial-correlation correction has diﬃculty estimating the eﬀect precisely.
Crucially, we ﬁnd that higher government borrowing slowed industrial growth.
We use the deviations from log trend, as in the earlier analysis, as well as growth
rates of government debt. The latter exhibit the same short-run volatility as the out-
put series and consequently contain more information that we can exploit to pin
down the relationship. We ﬁnd that, on average, a 1% rise in interest rates slowed
growth by 4–7%, and that for every 10% increase in government debt, industrial out-
put fell by 2–4% below trend.
The evidence presented in Fig. 6 and in Tables 4 and 5 is suggestive. ‘‘Crowding-
out’’ as an explanation of slow growth during Britains Industrial Revolution will be
strengthened if we can show that lower lending volume was suﬃcient to produce a
marked slowdown in growth, and if output growth responded quickly to changes
in lending. If lending at Hoares was broadly representative of that at other banks,
then the rationing eﬀects found earlier can be used to infer the overall impact of
more government spending.
The same VAR method used earlier can be employed to investigate the eﬀects of
government borrowing on national output (industrial production) more directly,
again using three lags
QGAPt ¼ a11QGAPt 1 þ a12QGAPt 2 þ a13QGAPt 3 þ b11DebtGAPt 1
þ b12DebtGAPt 2 þ b13DebtGAPt 3 þ c1 þ e1t; ð7Þ
DebtGAPt ¼ a21DebtGAPt 1 þ a22DebtGAPt 2 þ a23DebtGAPt 3
þ b21QGAPt 1 þ b22QGAPt 2 þ b23QGAPt 3 þ c2 þ e2t: ð8Þ
16 Note that this is not driven by many of the observations for positive lending gaps coming from the
period after the end of the Napoleonic wars we have 21 wartime observations from the 18th century in the
sample with HGAP P 0.
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The impact of war on industrial output growth (QGAP)—OLS and NLS estimates


























Estimator: OLS Marquardt NLS
Adj. R
2 0.43 0.13 0.54 0.16 0.06 0.73 0.71 0.74 0.71 0.71
LM
Note.
*,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance at the 90, 95, and 99% level of conﬁdence. t-statistics calculated on the basis of heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Dependent variable is the deviation of log industrial output from trend (QGAP).

































































3In this way, we allow for feedback eﬀects from output to borrowing as well as
from borrowing to industrial output. Fig. 8 shows the impulse response of output
to greater government borrowing. The eﬀect is negative at the 95% level from year
2 and remains substantial and signiﬁcant until year 5. A one standard deviation in-
crease of government debt reduced output by a cumulative 5.2% over 10 years,
according to the VAR estimate. An international ﬂow of capital to oﬀset the scarcity
of domestic credit as suggested by Neal cannot have had more than a limited eﬀect,
damping but not eliminating the consequences of domestic credit rationing.
We conﬁrmed this result with a three-factor VAR (not reported), adding HGAP
to the list of variables. As noted at the outset of this argument, Hoares lending is a
noisy proxy for total lending. The larger VAR conﬁrms the result shown in Fig. 8
that industrial output responded negatively to government debt, although the stan-
dard errors are larger. Hoares lending also declined in response to larger borrowing.
Finally, Hoares lending did not aﬀect industrial production. This implies that,
according to the VAR, changes to Hoares lending that were orthogonal to govern-
ment borrowing shocks did not exert an independent inﬂuence on output. The esti-
mate is the converse of our IV estimates in Table 3, where we used only the part of
Hoares lending that was aﬀected by government actions. The rest of Hoares lending
did not have any eﬀect on industrial production; loans by Hoares mattered so far as
they were driven by government borrowing, but not in their own right. The bank was
only a conduit for government policy, not an independent force aﬀecting national
income, as we would expect. This also suggests that, in the rest of our analysis, we
are not capturing spurious correlations between Hoares lending and the output
series.
All the individual elements that are necessary to make the ‘‘crowding-out’’ story
plausible are therefore in place—heavy government borrowing reduced private lend-
ing sharply, and industrial growth slowed markedly whenever public debt grew rap-
idly. This was especially true in years when the rise in public borrowing coincided
with a private-sector credit crunch. We ﬁnd that independent of the analytical tech-
nique used—from simply eyeballing the data to VAR analysis—quantity-based mea-
sures strongly suggest that ‘‘crowding out’’ in 18th-century Britain was substantial.
Fig. 8. Response of QGAP to Choletsky one SD innovation of DebtGAP.
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What is the connection between the ﬁnancial revolution and the industrial revo-
lution? We argue that earlier attempts to answer this question fell short because they
focused on direct measures of the cost of credit intermediation. This procedure is
ﬂawed because interest rates were heavily regulated in 18th-century England, and
there is ample reason to think that yields on government debt do not provide a
meaningful guide to scarcity. Knowledgeable observers from Adam Smith to T.S.
Ashton emphasized the importance of the usury laws in keeping interest rates low,
independent of credit conditions, and the normal asymmetric information problems
that dominate in many lending relationships.
We use micro-level evidence to argue that quantity rationing was indeed a key fea-
ture of Englands credit market during the Industrial Revolution. Annual balance
sheets from Hoares Bank allow us to trace changes in the volume of lending over
160 years, from 1702 to 1862. A number of ﬁndings stand out. Wartime borrowing
did crowd out private lending on a massive scale. When war was imminent,
Hoares—anticipating that it would have to pay out deposits so that its customers
could move funds into government securities—immediately started to boost its cash
ratio. It did so by reducing credit to its customers, calling in old loans and refusing to
make new ones. On balance, our results suggest substantial crowding-out, but per-
haps on a scale of somewhat less than 1:1 (where a 1% rise in government debt
led to a 1% decline in Hoares lending relative to their long-term trends). Instrumen-
tal-variable estimation suggests that wartime borrowing led to more severe crowd-
ing-out than normal government borrowing.
There is also ample evidence to suggest that the decline in lending volume slowed
industrial growth, and hence hindered Britains industrial transformation. Using the
changes in lending volume at Hoares as a proxy for total lending volume, we ﬁnd
that wartime contractions of output were particularly severe when accompanied
by a private-sector ‘‘credit crunch.’’ When the demands of Army and Royal Navy
did not lead to tight credit conditions at home, however, growth was largely
undisturbed. Our ﬁndings appear to suggest a comprehensive vindication of
the crowding-out hypothesis. Once the right variables are analyzed, the impact of
government borrowing is clear and strongly negative.
At the same time, our view into the lending process at an 18th-century goldsmith
also cautions against such a one-sided conclusion. In examining the impact of war-
time borrowing on private-sector lending volumes, we take the existence of a sophis-
ticated system of deposit-taking banks for granted. Hoares depositors left their
money in their bank accounts in the expectation that, every few years, they could
move their funds into safe government securities. It was war that provided this
opportunity. Hoares certainly considered the decline of deposits in wartime an inte-
gral part of its business, and it is an open question if its customers would have used
its intermediation services to the same extent if the British government had not pro-
vided them with large volumes of liquid, trustworthy bonds. Without periodic bouts
of ﬁghting the French, Dutch, or Spanish, and the attendant funding requirements,
the private banks—and not just the public securities markets emphasized by the lit-
P. Temin, H.-J. Voth / Explorations in Economic History 42 (2005) 325–348 345erature on the ‘‘ﬁnancial revolution’’—may have remained underdeveloped. The
high elasticity of savings noted by many historians of 18th-century Britain suggests
that private credit intermediation and government borrowing developed symbioti-
cally, with growth of one fostering the development of the other. It is possible that
the private sector could have developed alternative assets of similar appeal to con-
sols, thus fostering the growth of an exclusively private system of credit intermedia-
tion. The history of other countries, however, does not suggest that this was a likely
prospect. Hence, the negative impact of government borrowing that we document
may have been largely short-term in nature. The positive institutional impulse of cre-
ating a pool of liquid, low-risk securities may have easily outweighed it in the long
run.
Our results may also reconcile conﬂicting views of the Industrial Revolution.
Using estimated quantities of inputs and outputs, Crafts and Harley have continued
to emphasize slow growth and TFP growth. Factor prices analysed by Antra `s and
Voth support their conclusions (Antra `s and Voth, 2003; Crafts and Harley, 1992).
Slow growth appeared to imply limited changes in productive techniques. However,
using trade statistics, Temin found evidence of widespread technical change in Brit-
ain between 1770 and 1830, with the implication that economic growth should have
been faster (Crafts and Harley, 2000; Temin, 1997, 2000). If the Napoleonic Wars
reduced the rate of income growth, this apparent paradox disappears. Had wars
not interfered, British economic growth might have been more rapid in the late
18th and early 19th centuries as Temins microeconomic evidence suggests it should
have been.
17 Instead of being on a balanced growth path, where rapid and wide-
spread technological change should have led to faster growth and higher TFP, the
British economy was hit by a sequence of negative, war-related shocks that reduced
aggregate demand. Therefore, what slowed growth and depressed measured TFP
was not slow technological change, but the pro-cyclical nature of productivity in-
creases (Gordon, 1979). As Ashton put it (Ashton, 1968, pp. 103–104): ‘‘Govern-
ment borrowing had another, no less important eﬀect... Capital was deﬂected
from private to public uses, and some of the developments of the industrial revolu-
tion were once more brought to a halt.’’ Once the reservoir of technological advances
could be tapped undisturbed—after the end of the Napoleonic Wars—growth accel-
erated, TFP growth increased, and real wages began to rise.
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